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DRAWING THE LINE ON THE INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DEFENSE: UNITED
STATES V. DECOSTER (III)
In all critical stages of a criminal proceeding where an accused may
be imprisoned, the Supreme Court has declared that the sixth amend-
ment guarantees the accused a right to counsel." While the Supreme
Court requires the presence of an attorney for the defendant, the Court
has not yet established constitutional standards to govern the quality of
assistance. 2 A defendant's criminal rights cannot be adequately protected
without effective assistance of counsel.3 Consequently, the lower courts
have had to develop standards to adjudicate ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in all critical stages of the criminal proceedings.
4
Uncertainty about the constitutional basis for the right to effective
assistance, however, has hampered the courts in developing consistent
standards to govern ineffective assistance claims.5 Some courts adhere to
1 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 210, 227 (1966) (counsel must be provided at
critical stages of criminal proceeding to preserve defendant's right to fair trial); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)(accused entitled to assistance of counsel whenever his
liberty in jeopardy).
2 See Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 76-78 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Effective Assistance].
See Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8
(1956). Schaefer believes that effective assistance of counsel is a defendant's most funda-
mental right because it affects his ability to assert any other right he may have. Id. See also
Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 CIN. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Bazelon]; Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation In Criminal Cases: Depar-
tures From Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV. 927, 934-939 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bines];
Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1078-81 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Finer]; Grano, The Right To Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process,
54 MINN. L. REV. 1175, 1248 (1970).
" See, e.g., Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978
(1963) (failure to challenge validity of confession); Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579
(N.D. Tex. 1967) (failure to advise defendant of time limitations and right to appeal);
United States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (improper
representation as to terms of plea bargain). See generally Brody, Ineffective Representation
As A Basis For Relief From Conviction: Principles For Appellate Review, 13 COL. J. OF L.
& Soc. SC. PROBLEMS 1, 77-84 & n. 257-267 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brody]; Finer, supra
note 3, at 1081-1116.
a See, e.g., Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1011 (1978) (representation within range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases); United States ex rel. Ortiz v. Sielaff, 542 F.2d 377, 379 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Sielaff v. Williams, 423 U.S. 876 (1976) (minimum standard of professional
representation); United States v. Ramirez, 535 F.2d 125, 129-30 (1st Cir. 1976) (ineffective
representation defined as that which makes mockery, sham, or farce of trial); United States
v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327, 1333 (2d Cir. 1974) (whether woefully inadequate representa-
tion makes proceeding a farce and mockery of justice); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d
730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) (customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time
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the position that the right to assistance of counsel necessarily implies the
right to effective assistance, and so the sixth amendment is the source.'
Other courts reason that the right to effective assistance of counsel is
based on the due process clause of the fourteenth and fifth amendments.7
The consequences of the courts' uncertainty are readily apparent
when a defendant brings an ineffectiveness claim based on defense coun-
sel's breach of the duty to investigate." Since the constitutional basis for
the right is unclear, the courts have not outlined the parameters of the
lawyer's obligation to investigate.9 Without a definition of the duty, the
appellate courts cannot consistently evaluate counsel's efforts at investi-
gation.10 Additionally, a lawyer's failure to investigate is difficult for the
appellate courts to detect because often neither the trial court proceeding
nor the transcript reflects counsel's ommissions. 1 Because the appellate
courts are unable to protect a defendant's right to effective representa-
iion, the adversarial process does not function to ensure a fair trial.
1 2
The court system has shortcomings which exacerbate the problem of
lawyer's inadequate preparation.13 Courts are unable to accommodate the
ever increasing caseload. The backlog puts pressure on defense counsel to
dispose of each case as rapidly as possible.1 4 Where defense attorneys are
paid on a per hour basis with a statutory case minimum, there is an eco-
nomic incentive for lawyers to accept a large number of cases. 5 To expe-
dite case turnover, some lawyers obtain guilty pleas from their clients as
quickly as possible, often without investigation. If a trial is necessary, de-
fense attorneys, cognizant that compensation is greater for litigation than
investigation, may limit the time spent investigating, and as a result go to'
and place).
' Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d at 736 (sixth amendment constitutional source to
right to effective assistance); see text accompanying notes 36-39 infra.
7 See text accompanying note 21 infra.
8 See, e.g., Matthews v. United States, 518 F.2d 1245, 1246-47 (7th Cir. 1975); McQueen
v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 216-19 (8th Cir. 1974); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226-28 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
Compare text accompanying note 6 supra with text accompanying note 7 supra.
,D See text accompanying notes 188-193 infra.
" See Tague, The Attempt To Improve Criminal Defense Representation, 15 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 109, 112 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Tague] (inadequate investigation rarely
apparent to trial judge or appellate court reviewing record).
2 See text accompanying notes 159-165 infra.
'3 See Brody, supra note 4, at 21-24; Bazelon, supra note 3, at 15-17.
" See Bazelon, supra note 3, at 15-16; President's Comm'n On Law Enforcement And
Ad. of Just., Task Force Reps: The Court 57 (1967).
15 See United States v. DeCoster III, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 37 n.89 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(en banc) (Bazelon dissenting); United States ex rel Green v. Randle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115
(3d Cir. 1970); Bazelon, supra note 3, at 9-11. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. §
3006A(d)(1) (Supp. 1972) provides for payment on a per-hour basis with a statutory per case
minimum..Volume is the essential element in the regular's practice; a number of lawyers
have been able to earn $30,000 to $50,000 per year with fees averaging about $150 per case
for 250 to 350 cases per year. Bazelon, supra note 3, at 9.
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trial inadequately prepared.16 Acknowledging that judges are confronted
with overcrowded dockets, defense attorneys attempt to appease judges
by limiting the number of motions and simplifying the trial.17 Although
trial judges have supervisory powers which can be exercised to prevent
ineffective representation during the trial, the pressure to relieve the case
load and to avoid interference with the attorney- client privilege discour-
ages all but occasional exercise of judicial supervision.'
In reviewing claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellate
courts must balance the individual's right to a fair trial against the policy
of finality of judgments.' 9 Traditionally, the policy of finality of judg-
ments had guided the courts. The courts have succumbed to the pressures
of congested dockets and have avoided the temptation to reverse for tech-
nical errors. Courts have not generally considered ineffectiveness claims
unless the attorney's performance was so shocking as to make the trial "a
farce, a sham, or a mockery of justice."' 0
The farce and mockery standard is derived from the due process
clause of the fifth amendment and is applicable to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.2' Courts employing the
16 See Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1) (1976) which states that
attorneys are to be compensated at a rate of $30 per hour for time expended in court and at
$20 per hour for out-of-court time. Another part of the statute states that compensation per
case is not to exceed $1000 for felonys and $400 for misdemeanors. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2)
(1976).
"' See Bazelon, supra note 3, at 15-16. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. §
3006A(b) (1976), entrusts trial judges with the power of appointment and payment of de-
fense counsel. Id. Judges sometimes will subtract the cost of investigative services, provided
by Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (1976), from the defense attorney's
renumeration or will not appoint lawyers to new cases where too much time is spent on a
particular case. See Taque, supra .note 11, at 131.
"' See Brody, supra note 4, at 22-23. Trial judges will sometimes deny continuances to
reduce case load, which spawns ineffectiveness claims because of the lawyer's inadequate
preparation. Id.; see, e.g., United States ex rel. Spencer v. Warden, Pontiac Correctional
Center, 545 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1976).
'9 See McNann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 764-65 (1969) (balancing finality of guilty
plea against importance of informed voluntary waiver of a trial); Brody, supra note 4, at 23;
Bines, supra note 3, at 929-33. Bines argues that raising the standard for habeas corpus
review of ineffectiveness cases from the farce and mockery standard to a reasonable compe-
tence standard will not appreciably increase the number of habeas corpus actions. Bines,
supra note 3, at 933. If the number of habeas corpus petitions increased, the balance would
be tipped in favor of individual rights as opposed to finality of judgments. Id. at 941-942.
20 See United States v. Larsen, 525 F.2d 444, 449 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1075 (1976); United States v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327, 1333 (2d Cir. 1974); Diggs v.
Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1945), overruled, United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
2 See U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV. Both the fifth amendment and the fourteenth
amendment contain due process clauses. Id.; see, e.g., Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1, 3
(4th Cir. 1965), overruled, Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977) (in a direct
appeal from state conviction fourteenth amendment due process clause basis for farce and
mockery standard); Johes v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (fifth amendment was
basis for farce and mockery standard when conviction attacked collaterally with federal
habeas corpus writ).
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farce and mockery standard must determine whether defense counsel's
errors prejudiced the outcome by making a farce and mockery of the
trial.22 Specifically, a due process analysis requires the court to evaluate
the fairness of the trial from the totality of the circumstances. 2 Applying
the mockery of justice standard, the courts have granted a new trial only
for egregious errors, faults or omissions of counsel.2' The courts have la-
belled most claims of ineffectiveness as counsel's strategic or tactical deci-
sions and refuse to grant relief.
25
The mockery of justice standard has many substantive drawbacks. By
focusing on the fairness of the trial, the standard limits the judicial in-
quiry to errors at trial.21 Ineffective assistance of counsel, however, can
occur at any stage of a criminal proceeding.27 For example, defense coun-
sel, without engaging in any independent factual investigation, may ad-,
vise his client to plead guilty to a lesser charge.28 If minimal investigation
would have uncovered evidence to absolve the defendant of any guilt, a
valid claim to ineffective counsel should exist.2 Because counsel's error
did not occur at trial, however, the appellate court has no basis for evalu-
ating the defendant's claim. The appellate court is limited to whether the
trial itself was a farce and mockery.
The farce and mockery standard is also criticized for its failure to cre-
ate specific substantive duties of counsel to govern ineffective assistance
claims.30 The farce and mockery standard is too broadly framed to afford
a consistent manner of enforcement, and consequently the courts' ap-
praisal of the claim is inherently subjective.31 Another problem which is
amplified by the farce .and mockery standard is that courts have summa-
=' Bines, supra note 3, at 937. See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-43
(1963). In Gideon, the court compared the due process analysis used in Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 462 (1942), to the sixth amendment basis for the right to counsel, indicating that
the due process analysis requires an appraisal of the totality of the facts. 372 U.S. at 339.
23 See Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 16
(D.C. Cir. 1954). In Diggs, the court decided that the standard for review is the presence or
absence of fairness in the proceeding as a whole.
"4 See, e.g., Miller v. Hudspeth, 176 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1949); Tompsett v. Ohio, 146
F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1945); Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d
962 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 617 (1941).
25 See Henderson v. Cardwell, 426 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1970); Mitchell v. United
States, 259 F.2d787, 793-94 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
"' See Brody, supra note 4, at 32; see, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154,
1164 (5th Cir. 1974).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Edwards v.
United States, 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847 (1958); McLaughlin v.
Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Va. 1972).
See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970); McLaughlin v. Royster, 346
F. Supp. 297, 301-02 (E.D. Va. 1972).
29 See text accompanying note 40 infra.
30 See Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
In Coles, the Fourth Circuit articulated a set of specific duties counsel owes to his client. 389
F.2d at 226. Cf. note 42 infra.
31 See Brody, supra note 4, at 34-35.
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rily rejected ineffective assistance of counsel claims where the attorney
had favorable credentials.32 Since a lawyer's credentials are based on past
performance, the courts should not utilize them as the sole criteria to de-
termine whether defense counsel's performance was effective in a particu-
lar case.
These inherent drawbacks have led a majority of the courts to reject
the farce and mockery standard.38 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
not provided an alternative standard.3" Lower courts have adopted vari-
ous formulations of sixth amendment standards to replace the farce and
mockery test.3 5 According to sixth amendment standards, lawyers must
perform with reasonable competence and provide assistance within the
range of competence demanded of criminal attorneys."' Courts employing
a sixth amendment analysis separate the issue of the quality of counsel's
performance from the issue of whether counsel's deficiency effected the
trial's outcome.3 7 The farce and mockery due process analysis requires
31 See, e.g., Lee v. Alabama, 406 F.2d 466, 472 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
929 (1969); Anderson v. Robertson, 145 F.2d 101, 102 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S.
874 (1945); Taylor v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 132, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd mem., 521
F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1975). But see United States v. Butler, 504 F.2d 220, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
" See text accompanying note 35 infra. But see United States v. Ramirez, 535 F.2d
125, 129-130 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Larsen, 525 F.2d 444, 449 (10th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1075 (1976); United States v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327, 1333 (2d
Cir. 1974). The first, second and tenth circuits have retained the farce and mockery test
while all other circuits have rejected it.
31 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1976); Effective Assistance, supra
note 3, at 72-77. In Agurs, the Court summarily dismissed an allegation of counsel's failure
to request discovery of the defendant's past criminal record as a claim to ineffective assis-
tance. 427 U.S. at 102 n.5.
3 See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979) (reasonably competent and effective representation); Marzullo
v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978) (range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases); United States v. Malone, 558 F.2d
435, 438 (8th Cir. 1977) (exercise customary skill and diligence that reasonably competent
attorney would display under similar circumstances); United States ex rel. Ortiz v. Sielaff,
542 F.2d 377, 379 (7th Cir. 1976) (minimum standard of professional representation); Bur-
ston v. Caldwell, 506 F.2d 24, 27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 990 (1975) (reasonably
likely to render reasonably effective assistance); Beasley v. United States, 441 F.2d 687, 696
(6th Cir. 1974) (reasonably likely to render reasonably effective assistance); Moore v. United
States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) (customary skill and knowledge which normally
prevails at a time and place); Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(ineffective assistance when gross incompetence blotted out the essence of a substantial
defense).
38 See note 35 supra. The D.C. Circuit in United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip
op. at 17-18 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Decoster III) articulated a sixth amendment ineffective assis-
tance standard which requires "serious incompetency, inefficiency or inattention of counsel -
behavior of counsel falling measurably below that which might be expected from an ordi-
nary fallible lawyer."
3 See United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 40 n.96, 54 n.121 (Bazelon
dissenting); Matthews v. United States, 449 F.2d 985, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Scott v. United
States, 427 F.2d 609, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 789 (D.C.
Cir.) cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958). Bazelon stressed the importance of separating the
[Vol. XXXVII
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courts to combine the two issues and evaluate the quality of counsel's
performance in conjunction with the likelihood that counsel's errors
prejudiced the outcome.8 s Rather than considering the overall fairness of
the trial, courts utilizing a sixth amendment analysis determine whether
the alleged specific acts or omissions breached a-duty owed by counsel to
his client.5 9
The sixth amendment formulation has overcome many of the short-
comings of the farce and mockery standard. The reasonable lawyer analy-
sis does not confine the review of defense counsel's performance to the
trial proceeding, allowing the court instead to evaluate all aspects of the
assistance to the accused.40 By comparing defense counsel's performance
to that of a criminal lawyer with the customary skill and knowledge in the
community, the standard avoids to some degree the subjectiveness of the
farce and mockery standard. 4 1 Those circuits that have enumerated de-
fense counsel's specific duties adhere to an objective test 2 that provides
inquiry into the adequacy of counsel's performance from prejudice to the outcome of the
case. The distinction is vital to the difference between a claim for effective assistance of
counsel grounded in the sixth amendment rather than the fifth amendment due process
clause. No. 72-1283, slip op. at 54 n.121 (Bazelon dissenting). Since the District of Columbia
Circuit has adopted a reasonable competency standard based on the sixth amendment,
Bazelon urged that the relevant inquiry should be whether consel's performance was below
the level of reasonable competency rather than whether, under the totality of the facts, the
defendant was prejudiced. Id. In addition, Bazelon indicated an action for violation of due
process existed independently of the claim of ineffectiveness under the sixth amendment.
Id. at 40 n.96. The court in Mathews, Scott and Michell indicated that the sixth amend-
ment was the source of the right to effective assistance of counsel, however, the court ap-
plied the standard by considering. whether the overall outcome of the trial was affected. 449
F.2d at 988; 429 F.2d at 610; 259 F.2d at 789. See also Brody, supra note 4, at 72 n.240;
Bines, supra note 3, at 937-938.
See text accompanying notes 36 & 37 supra.
9 See note 37 supra.
40 See, e.g., Toilet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 264 (1973) (claim of improper assistance
in entering guilty plea); Brochs v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619, 622 (5th Cir. 1967) (failure to raise
insanity defense); United States ex rel. Wilkins v. Banmiller, 205 F. Supp. 123, 127-28 (E.D.
Pa. 1962), aff'd, 325 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 579 U.S. 847 (1964) (improper
guidance at sentencing).
41 See Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 692 (6th Cir. 1974); Bines, supra note 3,
at 938-40. In.Beasley, the court asserted that the farce and mockery test had no intrinsic
meaning and that the adoption of the reasonable lawyer standard provides the objective
analysis which the law demands. A more objective standard is evaluating the lawyer's per-
formance in terms of customary skill and knowledge in the community. See Finer, supra
note 3, at 1079; see, e.g., Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970). Some
circuits adhere to the position that the test must be stated in terms of the reasonable com-
petence of a criminal lawyer. See note 37 supra; see, e.g., Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d
540, 543.(4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); United States ex rel. Ortiz v.
Sielaff, 542 F.2d 377, 379 (7th Cir. 1976).
'2 See United States v. DeCoster (DeCosteri), 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), reu'd, No.
72-1283, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (plurality); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 849 (1968). The D.C. Circuit adopted basically the same standards set
out by the Fourth Circuit. 487 F.2d at 1203-04; 389 F.2d at 226. Judge Bazelon in Decoster I
promulgated the following standards:
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concrete standards to guide the adjudication of ineffectiveness claims.4
In United States v. Decoster III," the D.C. Circuit formulated a sixth
amendment reasonable lawyer standard to govern claims of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel.45 The court also articulated a framework for review
which expressly allocates the burden of proving prejudice.46 In conjunc-
tion with describing the operation of the framework, the court attacked
the problem of defining a lawyer's duty to conduct adequate investiga-
tion.47 The decision is noteworthy not only for the plurality's approach,
but also for the exhaustive additional opinions promoting alternative
approaches.
4
Chief Judge Bazelon raised the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel sua
sponte and directed that it be presented to the district court on a motion
for a new trial in United States v. Decoster (Decoster I), 4 9 the first of
In General-Counsel should be guided by the American bar Association Stan-
dards for the Defense Function. They represent the legal profession's own articu-
lation of guidelines for the defense of criminal cases.
Specificaly-(1) Counsel should confer with his client without delay and as often
as necessary to elicit matters of defense, or to ascertain that potential defenses are
unavailable. Counsel should discuss fully potential strategies and tactical chokes
with his client.
(2) Counsel should promptly advise his client of his rights and take all actions
necessary to prserve them. Many rights can only be protected by prompt legal
action. The Supreme Court has, for example, recognized the attorney's role in pro-
tecting the client's privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), and rights at a line-up, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227
(1967). Counsel should also be concerned with the accused's right to be released
from custody pending trial, and be prepared, where appropriate, to make motions
for a pre-trial psychiatric examination or for the suppression of evidence.
(3) Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal,
to determine what matters of defense can be developed. The Supreme court has
noted that the adversary system requires that "all available defenses are raised"
so that the government is put to its proof. This means that in most cases a defense
attorney, or his agent, should interview not only his own witnesses but also those
that the government intends to call, when t1 ey are accessible. The investigation
should always include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prose-
cution and law enforcement authorities. And, of course, the duty to investigate
also requires adequate legal research. 487 F.2d at 1203-4.
"s See United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 22-23 (D.C. Cir.
1979)(Decoster III) (plurality), slip at 25-29 (MacKinnon concurring). Both the plurality
opinion and MacKinnon, in his concurring opinion, express concern for the intrusion upon
the attorney-client relationship that may result from the adoption of the enumerated duties.
Id. Bazelon, however, stated in his dissent to DeCoster III that perserving flexibility is not
incompatible with establishing minimum components of effective assistance. Id., slip op. at
29 (Bazelon dissenting).
" United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Decoster III).
4 Id., slip op. at 17-18 (plurality).
46 Id., slip op. at 20-21 (plurality).
See Decoster III, slip op. at 24-27 (plurality), slip op. at 44-45, 50 (Bazelon dissent-
ing); text accompanying notes 75-79, 85-88, 93, 107-116 infra.
" See id., slip op. at 1 (plurality), slip op. at 1 (MacKinnon concurring), slip op. at 1
(Robinson concurring in result), slip op. at 1 (Bazelon dissenting).
-9 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Decoster I).
[Vol. XXXVII
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three appellate hearings of the case. 50 The events prompting the inquiry
into the adequacy of the defense counsel's preparation included the con-
flict between the defendant's and co-defendant's testimony and counsel's
failure to interview the arresting officers.51
To guide the district court in the resolution of the ineffectiveness is-
sue, the appellate court stated that a defendant is entitled to the reasona-
bly competent assistance of an attorney acting as the defendant's diligent,
conscientious advocate.52 Recognizing that the standard was merely a
shorthand label, the D.C. Circuit enumerated minimum components of
reasonably competent assistance.53 Among the responsibilities' the court
articulated was counsel's duty to conduct appropriate legal and factual
investigations." The court went on to state that if the defendant shows a
"0 See United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Decoster III),
United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Decoster II); United States v.
Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Decoster 1).
Decoster was convicted by a jury of assault with a dangerous weapon and aiding and
abetting two accomplices in an armed robbery. At trial, the arresting officers testified that
they witnessed the robbery and apprehended Decoster without losing sight of him. Decoster
offered an alibi as a defense to the charge. An accomplice, Eley, was called by the defense to
testify in support of Decoster's alibi, but Eley's testimony placed Decoster at the scene of
the crime. Decoster III, slip op. at 3-4 (plurality).
Decoster's two accomplices were not charged with armed robbery. Each was charged
only with robbery and placed on a five month probation. Id., slip op. at 11 n.20 (Bazelon
dissenting). Judge Bazelon's dissent in DeCoster III tracks the opinion he wrote -for the
majority in DeCoster I and DeCoster II. But see note 97 infra. MacKinnon's dissent in
DeCoster II analyzes the facts of the case in detail and his concurrence in DeCoster III sets
forth an extended analysis of the principles he used to apply to the facts in his DeCoster II
concurrence.
51 487 F.2d 1197, 1199-201. Appellant made seven allegations of defective performance
by his counsel.
(1) Counsel was dilatory in seeking a bond review while appellant was incar-
cerated for almost five months following his arrest on May 29, 1970;
(2) Counsel failed to obtain a transcript of appellants preliminary hearing
and failed to employ that transcript to impeach prosecution witnesses at trial;
(3) Counsel failed to interview any potential witnesses prior to trial;
(4) Counsel announced "ready" for trial at a time when he did not know
whether or not he would present alibi witnesses and before he had fully developed
his defense;
(5) Counsel offered to waive jury trial and to permit appellant to be tried
before the court when the court had heard a part of the evidence in connection
with the guilty pleas of the two co-defendants;
(6) Counsel failed to make an opening statement; and
(7) Counsel failed to see that appellant's sentence was properly executed, in
that he failed to see that appellant was given credit for time served.
Appellant also alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because of cousel's failure to object to appellant's appearing before the jury in
prison clothing. This objection was not asserted below, and therefore is not prop-
erly before this court.
Decoster III, slip op. at 27 (plurality).
52 Decoster I, 487 F.2d at 1202; see text accompanying notes 35 & 36 supra.
5' Decoster I, 487 F.2d at 1203-04; see text accompanying note 42 supra.
" Decoster I, 487 F.2d at 1203-04; see text accompanying note 42 supra.
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substantial violation of the enumerated duties, it follows that he was de-
nied effective assistance of counsel and is entitled to a new trial unless
the government can prove harmless error.55
During the evidentiary hearing, defendant's trial counsel acknowl-
edged that he had not interviewed any witnesses before the trial.56 Trial
counsel claimed, however, to have interviewed one witness during the
trial immediately before he testified.5 7 The district court therefore denied
the motion for a new trial, finding counsel's factual investigation "lax"
but not a substantial violation of the duty to investigate.5
In United States v. Decoster (Decoster II),59 the D.C. Circuit reversed
the district court's denial of a new trial. The court stated that the attor-
ney had breached the duty to perform independent investigation to iden-
tify witnesses and to substantiate new defenses.6 Ordinarily, the burden
is on the defendant to demonstrate the adverse consequences stemming
from defense counsel's derelection.6 1 The court held, however, that de-
fense counsel's total failure to investigate was so inherently prejudicial
that adverse consequences could be presumed where the consequences
were too difficult to prove.6 2 Although the court provided the government
with the opportunity to rebut the presumption of adverse consequences,
the government did not attempt to do so.
The D.C. Circuit in Decoster 111,63 on rehearing en banc, vacated the
Decoster II order for a new trial and affirmed the district court's finding
that Decoster's right to effective assistance of counsel had not been vio-
lated." Although four different opinions were filed, all of the judges
adopted a reasonable competence standard similar to the one formulated
in Decoster I, and agreed that the right to effective assistance of counsel
is grounded in the sixth amendment.65 Despite the similarity of the gen-
eral standards, the judges differed with respect to the content and scope
of counsel's duty to investigate.66 However,. only Judge Bazelon, in his
51 Decoster I, 487 F.2d at 1204.
Decoster III, slip op. at 28-29 (plurality).
17 Id., slip op. at 30-31 (plurality).
Decoster I, Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law on Remand at 19-20 (April 23,
1974).
59 No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Decoster II).
60 Decoster II, slip op. at 19.
6 Id., slip op. at 16-19.
2 Id., slip op. at 20-22.
6 No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. 1979)(Decoster III).
64 Id., slip op. at 3 (plurality).
65 Id., slip op. at 17-18 (plurality), slip op. at 2-3 (MacKinnon concurring), slip op. at 4-
5 (Robinson concurring in result), slip op. at 26-27 (Bazelon dissenting).
66 See id., slip op. at 24-27 (plurality), slip op. at 13 n.13, 14 & n.14, 16, 47-52. (MacK-
innon concurring), slip op. at 12, 39 & n.153, 41 n.158 (Robinson concurring in result), slip
op. at 31-36, 42-43 (Bazelon dissenting). The thrust of the plurality's and MacKinnon's per-
ceptions of the duty to investigate is that the scope of the obligation depends on the partic-
ular facts of the case and the likelihood that investigation will affect the outcome of the
trial. Bazelon and Robinson agree that counsel has an independent duty to conduct a thor-
DECOSTER (III)
dissenting opinion would retain the minimum duties of competent coun-
sel specified in Decoster .6
L 7
Judge Leventhal, author of the plurality opinion, advocated a case-by-
case inquiry.6 8 The plurality approach requires a defendant attempting to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel first to prove serious incompe-
tency, inefficiency, or inattention falling measurably below that which
might be expected of an ordinary, fallible lawyer." The defendant must
also show that counsel's deficiency likely deprived him of a substantial
defense.70 After the accused makes an initial showing, the burden passes
to the government to demonstrate that counsel's derelections did not
taint the conviction and did not result in prejudice to the outcome of the
case. 7 ' The weight of the government's burden will vary proportionately
ough investigation regardless of the particular factual situation. Bazelon emphasizes the
lawyer's obligation to promote diligently the interests of his client whereas the plurality and
MacKinnon believe that investigation is necessary to preserve the reliability of the verdict.
67 Id., slip op. at 27-31 (Bazelon dissenting); see note 42 supra.
See Decoster III, slip op. at 10 & 11, 22 & 23 (plurality). The plurality stated that
the courts have utilized different approaches to determine whether sixth amendment rights
are contravened depending on the nature of theparticular claim of denial of assistance in
each case. Id., slip op. at 5 (plurality). The neeil for showing prejudice and the exactness
with which violations can be identified and remedied is the basis for differences among the
cases. Id. Where a structural or procedural impediment by the state results in the denial of
the benefits of sixth amendment rights, the plurality indicated a categorical rule of per se
reversal is appropriate. Id., slip op. at 5-6 (plurality); see, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (failure of state to appoint counsel to indigent defendant in criminal trial).
Placing the various sixth amendment factual situations on a continuum, ranging from the
structural impediment cases to ineffective assistance of counsel cases, the plurality stated
the problem of late appointment necessitates a case-by-case approach requiring reversal
whenever the government could not prove harmless error. Id., slip op. at 8-9 (plurality); see,
e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). Since there are many aspects to a lawyer's
performance that create a potential basis for liability, the defendant must prove the likeli-
hood of prejudice for ineffective assistance calims. Id.; cf. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d
1325, 1332-41 (9th Cir. 1978) (distinguishing ineffective assistance of counsel claims where
prejudice must be shown from absence of counsel claims where showing prejudice unneces-
sary); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 218-20 (8th Cir. 1974) (same). But cf. Beasley v
United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) (no showing of prejudice required for inef-
fective assistance of counsel or absence of counsel claims); Moore v. United states, 432 F.2d
730, 734-37 (3d Cir. 1970) (same); but see Decoster III, slip op. at 56 n. 126 (Bazelon dis-
senting). Bazelon indicates that the plurality's distinction between direct state interference
cases and untrammelled and unimpaired ineffective assistance cases is irrelevant. Id. From
the defendant's perspective, according to Bazelon, the cause of inadequate representation
does not bear any relationship to the prejudice of the defendant's interests. Id.
69 Decoster III, slip op. at 17-18 (plurality).
70 Id.
71 Decoster III, slip op. at 21 (plurality). The D.C. Circuit adopted the approach
promulgated in Commonwealth v. Saferiun, 366 Mass. 89, 96, 315 N.E.2d 878, 883 (1974).
Id. The standard utilized by the plurality modified the standard previously used by the D.C.
Circuir in Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1967), that the defendant
establishes ineffective assistance by demonstrating gross incompetence of counsel and that
this has in effect blotted out the essence of a substantial defense. Decoster III, slip op. at 18
(plurality). The major change in the Bruce standard made by the Decoster III court was
that the requirement that the defendant show actual effect on a defense has been tempered.
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with the strength of the accused's showing.72 Applying the inquiry to the
Decoster facts, the D.C. Circuit found that the defendant established se-
rious incompetency on the part of defense counsel, but did not show
likely prejudice to the outcome of the trial.7 3 Ultimately dispositive of the
appeal was the strength of the government's case and Decoster's failure to
demonstrate the likelihood that more effective counsel could have pro-
duced exculpatory evidence.
7 '
A full understanding of the Decoster opinion necessitates an analysis
of the parameters the plurality placed on the duty to investigate. The
plurality stated that the duty to investigate depends on the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case.75 Whether counsel has a duty to investigate a spe-
cific subject depend% according to the plurality, on the weight of the evi-
dence and the potential impact the information may have on the case's
outcome.76 The plurality indicated that two factors which often condition
defense counsel's duty to investigate are information otherwise available
and already known to the attorney without specific investigation, and the
strength of the government's case.77 According to the plurality, Decoster's
Id., slip op. at 18 n.61 (plurality). The defendant must show only a likelihood of prejudice to
a defense. Id. The prosecution, however, is permitted to rebut the defendant's showing of
prejudice. Id. Another change to the Bruce standard made by the Decoster III plurality is
the requirement that the defendant show serious incompetency, ineffeciency or inattention -
behavior of counsel falling measurably below that expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer,
rather than gross incompetence. Id., slip op. at 17-18 (plurality).
7" Decoster III, slip op. at 21 n.71 (plurality). The Supreme Court stated that where a
court determines a constitutional violation has been established, the government must show
beyond a reasonable doubt that there has been no prejudice in fact. Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 21-24 (1967). If the defendant demonstrates serious derelections in counsel's
performance, yet is unable to make a showing of prejudice, the court may be satisfied with a
response by the government that no injustice has occurred. Id.
73 Decoster III, slip op. at 29 (plurality). The plurality admitted that serious incompe-
tency was established by the attorney's total failure to interview the policemen or the victim
and his failure to interview co-defendant Eley prior to trial. Id., slip op. at 39 (plurality).
Despite counsel's failure to interview the policemen or the victim, the plurality relied on the
trial judge's finding of no prejudice at the hearing and ruled that Decoster had not shown
that the errors prejudiced the outcome. Id.; see text accompanying notes 78 & 79 infra. The
plurality also found that counsel's failure to interview Eley before trial did not prejudice the
outcome because Eley unexpectedly produced damaging testimony at trial in a turnabout
from his testimony to counsel during the interview, and Decoster suggested his own guilt by
claiming an alibi at trial and self-defense in the letters. Decoster III, slip op. at 39
(plurality).
74. Decoster III, slip op. at 34 (plurality).
Id., slip op. at 24 (plurality).
78 Id., slip op. at 24-27 (plurality). The plurality stated that a reasonable indication of
materiality exists where a meaningful demonstration can be made that the specific investi-
gation probably would have affected the outcome of the trial. Id., slip op. at 29 (plurality).
• Id., slip op. at 24-27 (plurality). The preliminary hearing and the client himself may
make information otherwise available to defense counsel and thereby limit the duty to in-
vestigate. Id; see United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (decision
not to cross-examine witness not ineffectiveness where client could supply information);
United Stated ex rel Green v. Rundle, 452 F.2d, 232, 235 (3d Cir. 1971) (decision not to
interview others not ineffective assistance); cf. Matthews v. United States, 518 F.2d 1245,
DECOSTER (III)
inconsistent testimony in addition to the government's overwhelming evi-
dence of guilt limited trial counsel's duty to investigate.78 Decoster's im-
aginative speculation that counsel's further investigation might have un-
covered defense evidence was interpreted by the plurality as manifesting
his guilt, and thus implicit proof that Decoster could not realistically
meet the burden of proving likely prejudice.
79
Judge MacKinnon filed a concurring opinion describing a three step
process for establishing the defense of ineffective assistance of counsel
under the sixth amendment.8 0 Judge MacKinnon's analysis would require
the appellant to demonstrate first the existence of a duty owed by counsel
and, second, a substantial violation of that duty."' Third, the defendant
would be required to show actual prejudice to the outcome of his case
and, thus MacKinnon restricted the defense."2 Once the requisite showing
of actual prejudice was made, the burden would shift to the government
to rebut the defendant's case.88 After the government makes its showing,
the appellate court would review the whole record. A new trial will be
granted, if the defendant sustained his burden despite the government's
1246 (7th Cir. 1975) (no duty to investigate witnesses when client does not allege witnesses
or evidence exists).
78 Decoster III, slip op. at 28-32 (plurality).
79 Id., slip op. at 29 (plurality).
Id., slip op. at 34-35 (MacKinnon concurring). MacKinnon stated that a three step
inquiry would not be necessary when the violation and unfair prejudice to the defendant's
constitutional right are apparent on the face of the record. Id., slip op. at 29 n.24 (MacKin-
non concurring); see text accompanying note 105 infra.
Decoster III, slip op. at 34-35 (MacKinnon concurring).
SI Id., slip op. at 3 (MacKinnon concurring). MacKinnon stated that the defendant
could show prejudice with evidence of direct interference to the right to effective assistance.
Id., slip op. at 14 n.15 (MacKinnon concurring). The evidence would have to show that the
violation itself resulted in prejudice. Id. Alternatively, the defendant could demonstrate
prejudice indirectly by evidence that he was denied the essence of a fair trial. Id. The defen-
dant would have to show that the breach of duty, when added to the consequences, denied
him effective assistance of counsel. Id.
MacKinnon supported his conclusion that the defendant bears the burden of proving
actual prejudice for ineffectiveness claims, through an analysis of precedent in the D.C. Cir-
cuit, the Supreme Court's approach in fifth amendment cases, traditional common law prin-
ciples governing the burden of proof and the attorney-client relationship in the context of
the adversary system. Id., slip op. at 3 (MacKinnon concurring); see United States v.
Pinkney, 543 F.2d 908, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (D.C. Circuit precedent interpreting Decoster I
to indicate defendant must prove prejudice to his defense); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,
Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976) (com-
mon law principles support piacing burden on defendant, person pressing claim and party
with access to facts to prove claim); Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 116-17 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (D.C. Circuit before Decoster I supporting that defendant must prove ineffective
counsel blotted out essence of defense); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542 (1963) (most cases
involving fifth amendment due process deprivations require demonstration of prejudice to
accused); Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (presuming prejudice
would undermine adversary system, government would be forced to disprove prejudice from
privileged discussions of accused and attorney).
83 Decoster III, slip op. at 34 (MacKinnon concurring).
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rebutal.
84
Considering the facts before the Decoster court, MacKinnon agreed
that the defense counsel had violated his duty to investigate but asserted
that the defendant had failed to establish actual prejudice in light of the
overwhelming evidence of guilt.8 5 The duty to investigate, MacKinnon
stated, required defense counsel to investigate only non-fabricated de-
fenses.86 In Decoster, however, the defense lawyer realized that Decoster
was guilty. Counsel's obligation to investigate, concluded MacKinnon,
was limited to obtaining information necessary to put the government to
its proof.8 7 The appellant had not demonstrated sufficient prejudice to
the trial's outcome to merit relief, because appellant's counsel could not
produce exculpatory facts to prove Decoster's innocence.88
Id., slip op. at 27 n.24, 35 (MacKinnon concurring). MacKinnon stated that the de-
fendant must carry the full burden of proving prejudice and that the harmless error doc-
trine does not apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id., slip op. at 27 n.24
(MacKinnon concurring). Since the harmless error doctrine only applies to constitutional
errors that do not affect substantial rights of a party, MacKinnon reasoned in effective as-
sistance claims are outside the doctrine because the right is substantial. Id.; see Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). The Supreme Court in Chapman specifically mentioned
that the right to counsel was a substantial right to which the harmless error doctrine would
not apply. 386 U.S. at 23 n.8. However, the Court indicated per se reversal was appropriate
where the defendant's substantial rights were violated. Id. at 23. MacKinnon requires the
defendant to prove prejudice where substantial rights, such as the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel, are involved and, therefore, contravenes the reasoning in Chapman.
85 Decoster III, slip op. at 35-39 (MacKinnon concurring).
:6 Id., slip op. at 35 (MacKinnon concurring).
87 Id., slip op. at 35-38 (MacKinnon concurring). MacKinnon emphasized that counsel's
duty to investigate varies greatly from case to case. Id., slip op. at 14 (MacKinnon concur-
ring). The lawyer is responsible for adjusting his investigation strategy to accomodate the
foreseeability of prejudice. Id., slip op. at 14 n.14 (MacKinnon concurring). MacKinnon
noted three stiuations where the possibility of prejudice to the client's case would be effec-
tively eliminated, and therefore, and corresponding duty to investigate would be substan-
tially reduced. Id. When the accused admits guilt to his attorney, or the lawyer knows from
other evidence that the evidence of guilt is overwhelming or that the client is telling an
untruthful story, counsel's duty to investigate ceases. Id. Accordingly, MacKinnon stated
that Decoster's lawyer did not have a duty to investigate Decoster's contradictory state-
ments because they were conclusive proof that at least one statement was false. Id., slip op.
at 49-50 (MacKinnon concurring). Decoster initially attested to an alibi defense which re-
moved him from the scene of the crime and later in letters *written to his counsel and Judge
Waddy alleged a self-defense theory which effectively placed him at the scene of the crime.
See Record at 69, 70-72 (February 6, 1974). Once convinced of Decoster's guilt, MacKinnon
stated that Decoster's counsel did not have a duty to investigate Decoster's alibi defense
because the lawyer would violate the ethical standards by attempting to fabricate a defense.
Id., slip op. at 50-53 (MacKinnon concurring). An overall appraisal of MacKinnon's opinion
indicates that the lawyer's duty to investigate depends on whether circumstances exist
which call into question the reliability of the verdict. See id., slip op. at 47-49.
88 Id., slip op. at 39 (MacKinnon concurring). Other circuits adhere to MacKinnon's
view that appellant's counsel must produce actual facts that could have been discovered had
counsel performed adequate investigation to establish prejudice. See, e.g., Davis v. Alabama,
596 F.2d 1214, 1221 (5th Cir. 1979) (defendant must provide affidavits, depositions, or, if
necessary, live testimony of specific evidence that investigation would have uncovered);
Matthews v. United States, 518 F.2d 1245, 1246 (7th Cir. 1975) (defendant must allege ex-
DECOSTER (III)
Judge Robinson, concurring in the r~sult, advocated an approach to
evaluate ineffectiveness claims that deviated substantially from both the
plurality's and MacKinnon's tests. To establish a constitutional violation
of the right to effective assistance of counsel under the Robinson scheme
a defendant must demonstrate counsel's substantial breach of duty.8 9
Adopting the DecosterI formulation of defense counsel's duty to his cli-
ent, Robinson stated that a defendant is entitled to the reasonably com-
petent assistance of an attorney acting as a diligent, conscientious advo-
cate.90 Once a defendant shows that assistance fell substantially below
reasonable competence, a new trial must be granted unless the govern-
ment can establish that breaching the duty owed to the defendant was
harmless error.91 Robinson argued that the government, the beneficiary of
the error, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional
culpatory evidence or witness that exists or that where made known to attorney or that
could have been discovered by proper investigation); cf. Harshaw v. United States, 542 F.2d
455, 457 (8th Cir. 1976) (record must relfect allegation of anything investigation might have
been expected to produce); McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297, 300 (E.D. Va. 1972)
(defendant must demonstrate mere possibility that counsel's investigation might have un-
earthed favorable evidence). MacKinnon's requirement that the defendant produce evidence
sufficient to prove his innocence, however, is contrary to the Anglo-Sazon principle of juris-
prudence that the accused is innocent until proven guilty. See Decoster III, slip op. at 55-56
(Bazelon dissenting).
89 Decoster III, slip op. at 14 (Robinson concurring in result).
90 Id., slip op. at 9 (Robinson concurring in result).
91 Id., slip op. at 36 (Robinson concurring in result). Robinson supported the position
that the defendant need not prove prejudice to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel by analyzing the principles of the harmless error doctrine in Supreme Court cases
and also in cases specifically concerned with the right to counsel. Id., slip op. at 18-34
(Robinson concurring in result). In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court
indicated that two basic inquiries were relevant to determining the role of prejudice in con-
stitutional claims. Id. at 22-24. The first inquiry is whether the constitutional right at issue
is so basic to a fair trial that per se reversal is necessary. Id. at 23. Assuming the constitu-
tional right is not so basic that the government's violation of the right is not inherently
prejudicial, the second inquiry is a determination of the party who must bear the burden of
proving or disproving prejudice. Id. at 24. Robinson adopted the test in Chapman that re-
quires that the beneficiary of the error either prove no prejudice to the outcome of the case
or suffer a reversal of an erroneously obtained judgment. Id. (citing 1 J. Wigmore, EVIDENCE
§ 21 (3d ed. 1940)). Noting that the right to effective assistance of counsel is based in the
sixth amendment, Robinson stated proof of harm is not normally necessary to establish a
violation of a right specifically enumerated in the constitution. Decoster III, slip op. at 30
(Robinson concurring in result); see, e.g., Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 54 (1970); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 645 (1961). Arguing from analogy to the right to counsel, Robinson
indicated that a per se reversal rule may be appropriate for denial of effective assistanced of
counsel. Decoster III, slip op. at 30-35 (Robinson concurring in result); see Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8 (per se reversal rule applies to violations of right to counsel).
Because the courts can measure the effect of a violation of the right to effective assistance of
counsel on the outcome of the case, Robinson applied the principles inferred from prior
cases dealing with the harmless error doctrine and adopted the harmless error test. Id., slip
at 36 (Robinson concurring in result); see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967)
(Case remanded to ascertain impact of lack of counsel at lineup); cf. Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961) (per se reversal because degree of prejudice from absence of counsel
at arraignment can never be known).
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error complained of did not contribute to the verdict.9 2 Although the con-
clusion is inescapable that defense counsel in Decoster failed to conduct a
reasonably competent factual investigation, Robinson decided that the
substantial violation was harmless error.98 To justify finding hdrmless er-
ror, Robinson relied on the record which documented the government's
direct and positive proof, the number of government witnesses and the
consistency of their testimony.9
Chief Judge Bazelon, dissenting, recommended. a three step approach
to analyze ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Incorporating the enu-
merated duties articulated in Decoster I,95 Bazelon stated that the defen-
dant must first prove that one of the duties was breached.96 The second
92 Decoster III, slip op. at 14 (Robinson concurring in result).
1 Id., slip op. at 39 (Robinson concurring in result). Robinson emphasized that the
issue of whether defense counsel's investigation measured up to the constitutional standard
is independent of whether the deficiency in counsel's performance had no impact. Id., slip
op. at 36-37 (Robinson concurring in result). The first issue, counsel's performance, de-
mands an evaluation of the quality of service rendered, and the second compels an evalua-
tion of the harm resulting from the error. Id. Robinson found support for his approach in
United States v. Pinkney, 543 F.2d 908, 916-17 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Arguing that the defendant
in Pinkney did not put forth evidence to establish counsel's substantial breach of duty,
Robinson concluded that the question of prejudice was never reached. Decoster III, slip op.
at 39-40 (Robinson concurring in result). The court in Pinkney did, however, explain that
the government would be responsible for disproving prejudice once the defendant demon-
strated a substantial violation. Id.: see 543 F.2d at 916-17 n.59. In Decoster, Robinson ac-
knowledged that counsel substantially breached the duty to investigate, however, the error
did not materially affect the outcome of the case. Decoster III, slip op. at 39 (Robinson
concurring in result).
Although Robinson did not elaborate on counsel's duty to investigate, he expressed
agreement with Judge Bazelon's description of the duty. Robinson indicated that the inde-
pendent duty to investigate was necessarily a part of counsel's obligation diligently to ad-
vance the interests of his client. See Decoster III, slip op. at 12, 39 (Robinson concurring in
result), slip op. at 31-34 (Bazelon dissenting). Robinson's view that counsel has an indepen-
dent duty to investigate is consistent with his emphasis on separating the issue of the quali-
ty of counsel's performance from the issue of prejudice.
Decoster III, slip op. at 40 (Robinson concurring in result). In applying the harmless
error rule, the court must examine counsel's error, without regard to the weight of other
evidence, to determine whether the error might have swayed the fact finder and contributed
to the verdict. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 26 (1967); Field, Assessing The
Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error - A Process In Need Of A Rationale, 125 U.
PA. L. R.v. 15, 16-17 (1976). Robinson considered the overwhelming evidence of guilt as a
basis for evaluating the possibility that counsel would have obtained enough evidence to
create reasonable doubt through more thorough investigation. Decoster III, slip op. at 40
(Robinson concurring in result). Since substantial evidence accumulated at the time of trial
indicated that the probability of counsel discovering additional evidence was minimal, coun-
sel's lack of investigation did not result in the omission of evidence. See id. Counsel's error,
therefore, was harmless.
" See text accompanying notes 54 & 55 supra.
Decoster III, slip op. at 126 (Bazelon dissenting); see note 42 supra. Although the
drafters of the standards set forth in Decoster I stated that the guidelines are not criteria
for judicial evaluation of effectiveness, Bazelon argued that the standards represent the
rudiments of competent lawyering and should be the starting point for evaluating ineffec-
tiveness claims. Id., slip op. at 27-31 (Bazelon dissenting); see American Bar Association
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stage of Bazelon's approach required inquiry into whether counsel's de-
partures from the prescribed standards were excusable or justifiable.1
7
Resisting the temptation to adopt a per se rule,9 8 Bazelon stated that
upon a showing of a substantial violation, the burden shifts to the govern-
ment to prove harmless error.99 Bazelon emphasized that the government
could not discharge its burden of showing lack of prejudice simply by
pointing to overwhelming evidence of guilt, because the record may fail to
Project On Standards For Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function And The Defense
Function § 4-1.1(f) (2d ed. 1978).
97Decoster III, slip op. at 41 (Bazelon dissenting). Bazelon's approach for determining
whether a lawyer's breach of a duty owed to defense counsel was a substantial breach, not
excusable or jutifiable, is a change from the approach he advocated in Decoster II. See text
accompanying notes 61 & 62 supra. The Decoster II approach required the court to perform
a retrospective analysis of the facts to determine whether the presumption should be em-
ployed. The Decoster III approach required that the courts employ a forward-looking evalu-
ation of the facts to determine the propriety of counsel's actions. Bazelon's Decoster III
approach allows the courts to analyze the special problems from the perspective of the at-
torney engaged in the particular case. In Decoster II, Bazelon advocated that the court em-
ploy the presumption of adverse consequences where the defendant would not be able to
prove such consequences. See text accompanying notes 61 & 62 supra.
,3 Decoster III, slip op. at 65-66 (Bazelon dissenting). Bazelon stated that prejudice
from the denials of effective assistance of counsel may be so great and the possibility that
the government can prove lack of prejudice so small, that a per se rule may be appropriate.
Id., see, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978) (per se rule employed in
conflict of interest case because harm so prevalent yet impossible to prove); Fields v. Pay-
ton, 375 F.2d 624, 628 (4th Cir. 1967) (likelihood of prejudice so great that court presumed
prejudice where counsel not appointed until eve of trial). Bazelon also found support for the
per se rule in the Supreme Court's treatment of the right to assistance of counsel. Decoster
III, slip op. at.66 (Bazelon dissenting); see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488-489
(1978) (assistance of counsel constitutional right so basic to fair trial that harmless error
inapplicable); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) ("assistance of counsel too
fundamental for courts to indulge in nice calculations" regarding amount of prejudice re-
sulting from its denial). Bazelon adopted the harmless error test to accommodate those
cases where the reviewing court is able to isolate specific deficiencies in counsel's perform-
ance and can accurately guage the consequences of the errors, Id., slip op. at 66 (Bazelon
dissenting). Explicitly adopting the sixth amendment as the source of the right to effective
assistance of counsel, Bazelon relied on sixth amendment precedent to support the proposi-
tion that the government has the burden of proving prejudice. Id., slip op. at 54-55 (Bazelon
dissenting); see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978); Geders v. United States, 425
U.S. 80, 86 (1976). According to Bazelon, the primary distinction between sixth amendment
claim and a fifth amendment due process claim is that the defendant must demonstrate a
likelihood of prejudice to establish a due process claim. Decoster III, slip op. at 54 n.121
(Bazelon dissenting); see, e.g., Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) (en
banc) (recognizing sixth amendment basis for right to effective assistance, court stated ulti-
mate issue not prejudice but level of counsel's competency). Bazelon emphasized that his
approach separates the inquiry into the adequacy of counsel's performance, where the de-
fendant has the burden of proof, from the question of prejudice to the defendant, where the
government has the burden of proof. Decoster III, slip op. at 54 n.121, 59 n.131 (Bazelon
dissenting). By separating the two inquiries, Bazelon's approach enables the court to iden-
tify and brand as ineffective any conduct falling below minimum standards of competent
lawyering without regard to the client's guilt or innocence. Id., slip op. at 59 n.131 (Bazelon
dissenting).
" Decoster III, slip op. at 67 (Bazelon dissenting).
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furnish proof of prejudice precisely because of counsel's ineffective per-
formance. Therefore, the government must be able to isolate specific defi-
ciencies in counsel's performance and accurately guage the harmless con-
sequences of counsel's acts or omissions. 100
Applying the above standards to Decoster, Bazelon found that counsel
violated the duty to investigate.' 10 Unable to find defense counsel's
breach of the duty to investigate either excusable or justifiable, Bazelon
concluded that counsel's breach was substantial.10 2 The frequency and
pervasiveness of defense counsel's omissions convinced Bazelon that the
errors were not excusable. 0 3 According to Bazelon, there was no possible
justification for counsel's failure to investigate since his inaction did not
stem from prudent judgment or tactical considerations. 104 Since the gov-
ernment made no attempt to prove that counsel's gross violations did not
affect the verdict, Bazelon would have remanded the case to allow the
government to prove harmless error. 0 5 Bazelon noted that on several is-
sues the district court did not find a violation of counsel's duties and,
therefore, did not reach the question of prejudicial effect. 06
Judge Bazelon was unable to find a justification for counsel's substan-
tially inadequate investigation because he adhered to the theory that
counsel has an independent duty to conduct appropriate investigation.'0
"0 Id., slip op. at 66-67 (Bazelon dissenting). Both Bazelon and Robinson utilize the
same harmless error test. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
'" Decoster III, slip op. at 34-36 (Bazelon dissenting).
102 Id., slip op. at 42-51 (Bazelon dissenting).
103 Id., slip op. at 42 (Bazelon dissenting).
0 Id., slip op. at 42 (Bazelon dissenting); see United states v. Moore, 554 F.2d 1086,
1090-91 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (tactical decision not to place witness with impeachment testimony
on stand justified where witness susceptible to credibility attack); United States v.
Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (failure to cross-examine witness justified by
tactical consideration of preventing possibly damaged testimony).
:05 Decoster III, slip op. at 70 (Bazelon dissenting).
106 Id. slip op. at 68-70 (Bazelon dissenting). Bazelon stated that he was unable to sat-
isfy the harmless error test until several important questions concerning prejudice were re-
solved. Id., slip op. at 68 (Bazelon dissenting). One unanswered question was whether coun-
sel's failure to investigate affected Decoster's decision to go to trial rather than plead guilty.
Id. In addition, Bazelon was not convinced that the government in Decoster II was required
to prove harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., slip op. at 20 (Bazelon dissenting).
107 See id., slip op. at 44-45, 50 (Bazelon dissenting); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708, 721 (1948) (prior to trial accused entitled to rely on counsel's independent examination
of facts); Wolfs v. Britton, 509 F.2d 305, 308 (8th Cir. 1975) (attorney must investigate ac-
cused's admissions or statements to lawyer of facts constituting guilt); Jones v. Cunning-
ham, 313 F.2d 347, 353 (4th Cir. 1963) (lawyer has affirmative obligation to make suitable
inquiry to determine whether valid defense exists).
Bazelon indicated that investigation is crucial for several reasons. Decoster III, slip op.
at 31-32 (Bazelon dissenting). The proper functioning of the adversary system is achieved
only where both sides investigate and organize their case in advance of trial. Investigation is
vital to counsel's ability to cross-examine and impeach adverse witnesses. To assure that all
available defenses are raised, counsel must perform thorough investigation. Finally, investi-
gation is necessary to counsel's ability to plea bargain effectively, seeking advantageous
terms at trial, and urging favorable sentencing. Id.
DECOSTER (III)
Bazelon reasoned that counsel's duty to investigate is not relieved by his
perceptions of his client's guilt or innocence 08 Bazelon argued, therefore,
that Decoster's lawyer was not justified in ceasing investigation upon be-
coming convinced that Decoster did not have an alibi defense and was
guilty.109 Counsel's duty to investigate was not limited to witnesses that
he believed would support the client's case."1 When Decoster contra-
dicted his alibi defense by a subsequent plea of self-defense, Bazelon ar-
gued that counsel was still not relieved of the duty to investigate.""
Bazelon urged that counsel had an obligation to determine which account
was truthful and might be used as a valid defense.1 12 Even if both ac-
counts turned out to be false, counsel had a duty to investigate the truth-
fulness of the statements to avoid suborning perjury.113 Finally, Bazelon
argued that the apparent strength of the government's case was not a
justification for counsel's decision to limit the scope of his investiga-
tion. 1 4 According to Bazelon, an attorney must perform an independent
evaluation of the government's case to assure that his client will make an
informed decision to plead guilty or go to trial.115 In sum, Bazelon found a
substantial violation because counsel did not perform independent factual
investigation to resolve the discrepancies in Decoster's alibis or interview
I Decoster III, slip op. at 44 (Bazelon dissenting); see ABA STANDARDS § 4-4.1 (2d ed.
1978) (duty to investigate exists regardless of accused's admissions or statements to lawyer
of facts constituting guilt). Both the Eighth and Fourth Circuits have adopted the ABA
standard. See, e.g., Wolfs v. Britton, .609 F.2d 305, 308 (8th Cir. 1975); Coles v. Peyton, 389
F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968). Bazelon stated that the Constitution entitled a criminal defen-
dant to a trial by a jury, not by his court appointed defense counsel. Decoster III, slip op. at
45 (Bazelon dissenting).
109 Decoster III, slip op. at 44 (Bazelon dissenting).
110 Id., slip op. at 48-49 (Bazelon dissening. Since the co-defendants had pleaded
guilty, defense counsel anticipated that their testimony would hurt Decoster's alibi defense.
Id., see Stokes v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 131, 137 (4th Cir. 1970) (failure to interview cannot be
justified by attorney's belief that testimony would not help); ABA STANDARDS § 4-4.1 (2d ed.
1978) (duty of lawyer to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to guilt or degree of
guilt or penalty). Bazelon also noted that defense counsel cannot limit himself to interview-
ing only those witnesses his client affirmatively requests. Decoster III, slip op. at 49 n.110
(Bazelon dissenting); see, e.g., Garton v. Swenson, 497 F.2d 1137, 1140 (8th Cir. 1974) (coun-
sel's failure to investigate may constitute ineffective assistance although court did not in-
quire into communication between counsel and client); Andrews v. United States, 403 F.2d
341, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1966) (same).
" Decoster III, slip op. at 49-50 (Bazelon dissenting); see Jones v. Cunningham, 313
F.2d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1963).
112 Decoster III, slip op. at 50 n.112 (Bazelon dissenting).
113 Id., slip op. at 50 n.112 (Baselon dissenting).
Id., slip op. at 50-53 (Bazelon dissenting); see ABA STANDARDS § 4-5.1(b) (2d ed.
1978) (lawyer should inform himself on fact and law and then advise accused with complete
candor as to his estimate of the, probable outcome of trial).
115 Id.; see Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948) (client has right to rely on
counsel's independent examination of facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws to offer in-
formed opinion as to enter guilty plea); ABA STANDARDS § 4-6.1(b) (2d ed. 1978) (duty to
explore disposition of case without trial).
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the officers and codefendants to impeach their testimony.1 1 6
The basic distinction between the various procedures developed in the
four opinions for evaluating ineffectiveness claims centers on the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof. The plurality requires, and MacKinnon
agreed, that the defendant should have to prove prejudice to establish a
violation of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.1
The Robinson and Bazelon opinions, however, would place the burden on
the government to prove harmless error."18 In an analysis of the role of
prejudice in Decoster III, the initial question must be whether actual
prejudice is a legitimate consideration in the assessment of a claim of in-
effective assistance of counsel. If prejudice is a relevant concern, the sec-
ond issue that must be addressed is the party responsible for proving or
disproving prejudice.
Turning to the first inquiry, court ' treatment of the role of prejudice
should be similar for violations of the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel and the right to counsel, since the expansion of the right to counsel is
based on the accused's right to effective assistance of counsel." 9 The Su-
preme Court has applied a per se rule where a violation of the right to
counsel is inherently prejudicial and encroaches on the accused's ability
to assert his rights and defenses throughout the trial.2 0 In cases involving
right to counsel violations where the range of possible negative conse-
qucences is capable of measurement, the Court has applied the harmless
error test."2'
The Decoster III court's decision to permit a showing of prejudice for
denial of effective assistance of counsel is consistent with the Supreme
Court's treatment of the role of prejudice for violations of the right to
counsel. Where the right to effective assistance of counsel is violated,
prejudice may not invariably occur and the extent of injury will usually
be capable of accurate measurement. 22 Since the defendant is required to
specify the aspects of. counsel's performance that form the basis for the
action, measuring the effect of prejudice is facilitated in claims of ineffec-
tive assistance.2 3
With respect to the second issue, the party bearing the burden of
11" Decoster III, slip op. at 42-43, 47-48 (Bazelon dissenting).
S1 ee text accompanying notes 70 & 82 supra.
118 See text accompanying notes 91 & 99 supra.
11 See Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328-29 (9th Cir. 1978); Moore v. United
States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970); People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, _; 152 Cal. Rptr.
732, 739, 590 P.2d 859, 866 (1979) (en banc); Bines, supra note 3, at 936 n.47.
" See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 43 (1967); White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59, 60 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
"' See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967). See also Moore v. Illinois, 434
U.S. 220 (1977).
... See, e.g., United States ex reL. Chambers v. Maroney, 408 F.2d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir.
1969), afl'd, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Martin v. Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, 365 F.2d 549, 551-552 (4th Cir. 1966).
111 See United States v. Pinkney, 543 F.2d 913-915 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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proof, courts should address violations of the right to effective assistance
of counsel consistently with other sixth amendment violations. Prejudice
is normally presumed when a defendant's sixth amendment right is vio-
lated. The government is provided the opportunity to rebut the presump-
tion.12 4 Only in cases involving the denial of the sixth amendment right to
a speedy trial has the Court required that the defendant prove
prejudice.125 The harmless error test requires that the beneficiary of the
error prove a lack of prejudice. 28 Since the denial of the right to a speedy
trial may benefit the defendant, courts have allocated the burden of prov-
ing prejudice consistently with the harmless error rule."2 7 The govern-
ment is the beneficiary of defense counsel's omissions. Bazelon and
Robinson argued correctly, therefore, that the government should be re-
quired to prove harmless error in the case of ineffective assistance."28 The
plurality's and MacKinnon assertion, however, that the defendant make a
positive showing of prejudice is not consistent with Supreme Court
precedent." 9
The discrepancy among the opinions concerning the party responsible
for carrying the burden on prejudice may be explained by the plurality's
continued reliance on due process clause analysis used in conjunction
with sixth amendment claims. 3 0 The plurality adopted a sixth amend-
ment standard which requires the court to evaluate defense counsel's per-
formance against the conduct expected of an ordinary fallible lawyer.' 3'
Although the plurality formulated a reasonable competency standard
based on the sixth amendment, they evaluated counsel's performance
with a totality of the circumstances approach, which emphasizes reliabil-
ity of the verdict."'3 The proper approach for analyzing sixth amendment
violations is to examine each alleged failure of defense counsel with refer-
ence to the obligation placed on criminal lawyers by the sixth amend-
ment."3s Chief Judge Bazelon emphasized the importance of separating
124 See text accompanying notes 72 supra.
225 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 536 (1971).
125 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1966). See generally 1 Wigmore, EvI-
DENCE § 21 (3d ed. 1940).
127 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 521. The Court indicated that a delay in the trial
may cause witnesses to become unavailable and their memories to fade, thereby weakening
the prosecutor's case and benefitting the accused in some cases. Id. The inability of courts
to provide a prompt trial also contributes to the backlog of cases, noted the Court, for which
there is societal interest in assuring a speedy trial. Id. at 519.
'28 See, e.g., Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 54-55 (1970); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 116 (1934).
1' See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 24.
130 See Decoster III, slip op. at 29 (plurality), slip op. at 39 (MacKinnon concurring).
The plurality and MacKinnon indicate that they are analyzing the Decoster facts in view of
the totality of the circumstances.
M2 See text accompanying 69 supra.
2 See text accompanying notes 73 & 74, 78 & 79 supra.
233 See 543 F.2d at 916 & n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730,
737 (3d Cir. 1970). The Third Circuit in Moore, relying on the sixth amendment, stated that
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the inquiry into the adequacy of counsel's performance from the question
of guilt, as the basic distinction between the sixth amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel and the fifth amendment right to a fair
trial.'3 4 The sixth amendment standard imposes a higher duty upon coun-
sel to a client. 3 5 According to Judge Robinson, the accused's right to ef-
fective aid would place a duty on counsel to pursue a course reasonably
calculated to achieve the most advantageous resolution of the case. 36
Bazelon's emphasis on defense counsel's independent obligation to inves-
tigate corresponds with Robinson's articulation of the duty to investi-
gate. 1 7 By presuming prejudice upon counsel's substantial breach and al-
locating the burden to the government to disprove prejudice rather than
to defense counsel to prove prejudice, both Bazelon and Robinson would
reinforce counsel's substantial obligation to investigate.
As a consequence of the plurality's reliance on a due process analysis,
lawyers will be held to a lesser standard of performance than would have
been required under sixth amendment analysis. Since the courts will sur-
vey the overall fairness of the trial,"s8 specific errors of counsel that con-
stitute a potential sixth amendment violation may be overlooked."s 9
Counsel's errors that do not influence the trial proceeding will go unde-
tected. Since the D.C. Circuit will not enforce the duty to investigate in-
dependently of the verdict's reliability,"4 0 the quality of counsel will not
improve.' 4' By regarding the enumerated duties as mere guidelines, the
court has failed to provide substantive content to the standard of reason-
ably competent assistance. 4' The court eliminated another opportunity
to increase defense counsel's accountability to his client, by finding that
the government did not have the burden of proving lack of prejudice.
The plurality's reluctance to employ the stricter sixth amendment ap-
proach rather than the due process analysis is based on their adherence
to the principle of finality of judgments. 14 ' To limit the number of rever-
the ultimate question is not whether a defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's act or
omission, but whether counsel performed as a reasonably competent lawyer. Id.
1"4 See Decoster III, slip op. at 54 n.121, 59 n.131 (Bazelon dissenting).
135 See Scott v. United States, 427 F 2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223-27 (1967).
136 Decoster III, slip op. at 7 (Robinson concurring in result).
13 Id., slip op. at 50 (Bazelon dissenting); see Jones v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 347, 353
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 832 (1963).
158 See text accompanying notes 73 & 74 supra.
119 See text accompanying notes 23-29 supra.
140 See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
M See text accompanying notes 133-136 supra.
141 See Decoster III, slip op. at 14-15 (plurality). The plurality stated that the stan-
dards were not put forth by the ABA as a set of per se rules applicable to post conviction
procedures but as a blend of description of function, functional guidelines, and ethical
guidelines. The plurality dismissed them as aspirational, but impractical. Id. at 15. But see
slip op. at 28-31 (Bazelon dissenting).
14' See Decoster III, slip op. 19-20 (plurality); Note, Identifying And Remedying Inef-
fective Assistance Of Counsel: A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L.
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sals, appellate courts will often uphold a conviction as long as the trial
court attained a reliable verdict. 144 Since a lawyer makes an infinite vari-
ety of decisions, the effectivenss standard should be flexible enough to
accommodate the strategic decisions of counsel.145 Counsel's competent
judgments must be afforded great weight and a trial judge's decision
should be respected because of his first-hand knowledge of the
proceeding.
14 6
The detrimintal consequences of reversals for ineffective assistance of
counsel may subvert the judicial process.147 Reversals for a new trial usu-
ally become lost convictions because the government's witnesses and evi-
dence go stale in the interim between the reversal and the new trial.14s As
a result, the efficacy of the correctional process is destroyed. In addition,
overgenerous reversals encourage frivolous appeals, introduce unreliabil-
ity into the fact-finding process, drain adjudicatory resources and dimin-
ish public respect for the criminal process.
4 9
Placing the burden on the government to disprove prejudice may re-
quire intrusion into the attorney-client relationship to insure that defense
counsel performs adequately. 150 Such inquiries may redefine the institu-
tional duties of the prosecutor, trial judge and counsel. The prosecutor
may have to oversee decisions and activities of defense counsel to protect
a prospective guilty verdict.' 52 The prosecutor may ask the trial judge to
correct and direct decisions or acts of defense counsel to prevent
prejudice. 52 Judicial supervision of tactical decisions of counsel may in-
hibit counsel's ability to make quick judgments.' 5 '
REv. 752, 764-65 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Remedying Assistance]; text accompanying
notes 130-134 supra. See also Bines, supra note 5; Comment, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel:: Who Bears the Bruden of Proof, 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 29 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Who Bears the Burden]; Note, Effective Assistance Of Counsel: A Constitutional Right In
Transition, 10 VAL. L. REv. 509 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Right In Transition].
144 Decoster III, slip op. at 29 (plurality).
145 Id., slip op. at 10 (plurality).
,4 Id., slip op. at 14-16 (MacKinnon concurring).
147 See Decoster III, slip op. at 22-23, 35 (plurality).
148 See id., slip op. at 35 (plurality), Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 791-92
(D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1967); Bines, supra note 3, at 940-41.
149 See Bines, supra note 3, at 963-64. But see Who Bears The Burden, supra note 143,
at 52; Note, Standard For Effective Assistance of Counsel, 1976 WAsH. U. L. Q. 503, 507-08.
[hereinafter cited as Standard For Assistance]. Some commentators argue that
overgenerous reversals will result overall in lower quality lawyering. See id.; Who Bears The
Burden, supra note 143, at 52. Attorneys may be discouraged from accepting appointments
for fear of being called incompetent. See Standard For Assistance, supra, at 507-08. In
addition, lawyers unconcerned with their repuration may seek to damage a strong govern-
ment case by not preparing at all and obtaining an appeal in the hope that much of the
governme'nt's evidence will go stale. See Who Bears The Burden, supra note 143, at 52.
150 Id., slip op. at 11, 22 (plurality), slip op. at 25-27 (MacKinnon concurring); see Who
Bears The Burden, supra note 143, at 52-53.
151 Decoster III, slip op. at 22 (plurality), slip op. at 25-26 (MacKinnon concurring).
152 Id., Bines, supra note 3, at 961.
'83 Decoster III, slip op. at 22 (plurality). MacKinnon noted that common law princi-
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The right to effective assistance is an enumerated constitutional right
however, and therefore, a sixth amendment approach should be followed
to uphold the integrity of the court system.1 5 4 The judicial system can
only be sustained if the constitutional safeguards are enforced regardless
of the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 55 The constitution entitles every
defendant to an active advocate on his behalf, and therefore, the defen-
dant should hot have to prove prejudice to obtain relief when effective
advocacy is absent.1 56 Employing a due process analysis and requiring the
defendant to prove prejudice denudes the constitutional right to effective
assistance of its value. 57 To improve the quality of lawyering for all de-
fendants, the court's interest in constitutional procedural safeguards must
outweigh the interest in finality of judgment.""8
The success of the adversary system is dependent upon attorney com-
petence.8 9 The adversary system has been compared to a three-legged
stool, the trial judge, prosecutor and defense attorney.160 If anyone of the
ples dictate that when the knowledge necessary to disprove an element of cause of action
within special knowledge of a defendant, the defendant should have the burden of proof on
that element. Id., slip op. at 23-24 (MacKinnon concurring). Since the government is highly
restricted in its ability to discover due to the attorney-client privilege and the fifth amend-
ment 1rivilege against self-incrimination, McKinnon reasoned that the defendant should
have to prove prejudice to obtain relief for a claim of ineffective assistance. Id.
... Id., slip op. at 54 & n.121 (Bazelon dissenting). See generally Gard, Ineffective As-
sistance of Counsel - Standards And Remedies, 41 Mo. L. R.v. 483, 503-04 (1976); POOL,
Defending The "Guilty Client", 64 MASS. L. REV. 11 (1979).
2" Decoster III, slip op. at 54-56 (Bazelon dissenting); Remedying Assistance, supra
note 143, at 767-68; Right In Transition, supra note 143, at 550-52.
15 Decoster III, slip op. at 54-56 (Bazelon dissenting); see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475, 484 (1978); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1976). Bazelon argued that
both Holloway and Geders support his position that a showing of prejudice is unnecessary
to establish a sixth amendment violation. See Decoster III, slip op. at 56-58 (Bazelon dis-
senting). The plurality distinguished Geders on the ground that counsel's ineffectiveness
was impeded by direct state interference. Decoster III, slip op. at 7 (plurality). In Geders,
the Court found a sixth amendment vilation where a defendant had been ordered not to
consult with his attorney during overnight recess between direct and cross-examination. 425
U.S. at 82, 83 n.1. Bazelon remarked that the defendant is unconcerned with whether the
state is responsible for counsel's inadequacy but whether his constitutional rights were vio-
lated. See Decoster III, slip op. at 56 n.126 (Bazelon dissenting). MacKinnon attempted to
distinguish both Geders and Holloway as cases where counsel was actually denied his coun-
sel, not bearing on the question of how effective was the representation. See Decoster III,
slip op. at 30 (MacKinnon concurring). In Holloway, the Court found a sixth amendment
violation where the trial judge refused to appoint separate counsel despite counsel's re-
peated assertions that a conflict of interests existed. 435 U.S. at 484. Bazelon rejected the
distinction, urging that the sixth amendment demands active representation and, therefore,
a defendant's constitutional rights would be violated regardless of whether the assistance is
ineffective or is denied altogether. Decoster III, slip op. at 58 n.123 (Bazelon dissenting).
5 Decoster III, slip op. at 39 (Robinson concurring in result).
1" Id., slip op. at 74-77 (Bazelon dissenting); See Remedying Assistance, supra note
143, 763-67; Right In Transition, supra note 143, at 549.
"I See Decoster III, slip op. at 74-75 (Bazelon dissenting); Bazelon, supra note 3, at 2;
Remedying Assistance, supra note 143, at 767.
,60 See Comment, A Standard For The Effective Assistance Of Counsel, 14 WAKE FOR-
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three is inadequate, imbalance will result depriving the defendant of his
day in court.16' The sixth amendment demands that counsel diligently
represent the interests of his client."6 2 If defense counsel is ineffective, the
prosecution will not be forced to meet the burden of proof, 6 and the
fact-finding process will not be reliable.'" Reversal is necessary regardless
of the reliability of the trial court's verdict because the defendant has not
been tried by constitutional standards.' To limit the number of retrials
based on claims of ineffective assistance, the trial judge must take an ac-
tive role in assuring that the accused receives a fair trial.166
Enumerating the minimum duties of counsel would give content to the
standard of effective assistance and permit a court to evaluate specific
errors of counsel under a sixth amendment approach.67 A court adopting
the minimum duties would provide the trial judge and appellate courts
with an objective measure of counsel's performance.68 In addition, an ob-
jective basis for reviewing counsel's assistance enables the client to gauge
accurately counsel's performance. The client would be able to question
the lawyer about his actions to prevent ineffective assistance claims from
arising. The client would also be aware of the evidence needed to make a
colorable claim for ineffectiveness on appeal. 169 The courts' articulation of
minimum duties would aid counsel himself because counsel could more
readily avoid breach.
70
The source of the confustion surrounding the issue of which party
must prove prejudice arises from the procedural requirements for raising
a claim of ineffective assistance. 17 ' A claim for ineffective assistance may
EST L. REV. 175, 193 (1978).
161 See Bazelon, supra note 3, at 2, 26-27.
162 See Decoster III, slip op. at 54 (Bazelon dissenting); Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738, 744 (1967).
163 Decoster III, slip op. at 61 n.134 (Bazelon dissenting); See Right In Transition,
supra note 143, at 546.
28 See Decoster III, slip op. at 61-63, 63 n.139 (Bazelon dissenting); Right In Transi-
tion, supra note 143, at 542-43.
16I Decoster III, slip op. at 54 (Bazelon dissenting).
166 Decoster III, slip op. at 76-77 (Bazelon dissenting); see id., slip op. at 14 n.38
(Bazelon dissenting). Bazelon stated that when the defendant makes a pretrial challenge to
the adequacy of counsel, the trial judge should inquire into the defendant's allegations. Id.
167 Decoster III, slip op. at 8 (Bazelon dissenting); see Brody, supra note 4, at 53; text
accompanying notes 42 supra. Ensuring that a defendant received a fair trial in compliance
with due process does not comport with Gideon's requirement of equal partisan advocacy
under the sixth amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-43 (1963); see Bines,
supra note 3, at 936-38; Right In Transition, supra note 143, at 512-14. The courts' adop-
tion of the minimum duties of counsel will ensure that a defendant's sixth amendment
rights are protected.
1" Decoster III, slip op. at 26-27 (Bazelon dissenting); see Brody, supra note 4, at 53;
Remedying Assistance, supra note 167, at 765; Effective Assistance, supra note 2, at 125-27.
169 See Effective Assistance, supra note 2, at 125-27.
70 See Decoster III, slip op. at 28-31 (Bazelon dissenting); Remedying Assistance,
supra note 1, at 765-64; Effective Assistance, supra note 2, at 125-27.
171 See Taque, supra note 11, at 148-152. Taque outlines the procedures for bringing
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be raised on direct appeal. The appellate court must evaluate counsel's
performance based on the trial record. 172 Counsel's breach of the duty to
investigate will probably not be substantiated by the record because the
claim arises from counsel's omissions rather than his actions at trial."
53
The D.C. Circuit in Decoster I explained that a claim of ineffectiveness
could best be raised as a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence.174 Under the procedure, the record could be supplemented by
affidavit and when necessary the district judge could order a hearing to
aid the defendant in establishing his claim.
17 5
A motion for a new trial requires the disclosure of evidence that is
both material and capable of mounting a serious challenge.1 6 The plural-
ity's failure to distinguish between a defendant's showing of prejudice
and a showing of materiality explains the D.C. Circuit's break from Su-
preme Court precedent.'7 The D.C. Circuit defines material evidence as
that which might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about
appellant's guilt.178 The court's application of the test for demonstrating
materiality requires an overall examination of the verdict's reliability and
will necessarily depend on the strength of the government's case. 79 Al-
though a defendant's presentation of material evidence will approach that
which a defendant presents to demonstrate prejudice, a defendant should
not have to prove prejudice as an element of the constitutional claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Bazelon presented a workable approach to the problem of ineffective
representation which balances the competing policies. 8 0 The courts' en-
forcement of the minimum duties of counsel would provide content to the
claims for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal and on collateral attack. Id. See
also Decoster III, slip op. at 18-20 (plurality); Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 116-17
(D.C. Cir. 1967). In Bruce, the court stated a more powerful showing of ineffectiveness is
necessary on collateral attack than on direct appeal. 379 F.2d at 117. The D.C. Circuit in
Decoster III indicated the standard for bringing a claim for ineffectiveness in a habeas
corpus action. Decoster III slip op. at 19 (plurality). Save for an exceptional claim that both
could not have been raised on appeal and that constituted a fundamental defect resulting in
an inherent miscarriage of justice, the defendant must show a constitutional violation. Id.
172 See United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 931, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (affidavits not
considered on direct review); Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 32 n.3 (9th Cir. 1962) (ex-
amination limited to trial record on direct appeal); Brody, supra note 4, at 87.
13 See United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (failure to investi-
gate rarely apparent from record); United States v. Mandello, 426 F.2d 1021, 1022 (4th Cir.
1970) (same).
174 487 F.2d at 1204-05.
175 Id. at 1205.
178 See United States v. Pinkney, 543 F.2d 908, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
177 See text accompanying notes 125-129 supra.
178 See United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 964-65 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Levin v.
Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
179 Compare United States v. Lightfoot, 506 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974) and Marshall v.
United States, 436 F.2d 155 (D.C. Cir. 1971) with United States v. Smallwood, 473 F.2d 98
(D.C. Cir. 1972) and Newsome v. Smyth, 261 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1958).
180 See text accompanying notes 95-100 supra.
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sixth amendment standard, permit lawyer self-regulation and accommo-
date objective judicial review. Since Bazelon articulated the duties in gen-
eral terms and the courts would be required to find a substantial violation
of a duty to reverse, the flexibility a defense lawyer needs would be re-
tained. Needless retrials would be avoided through the application of the
harmless error doctrine. Adopting Bazelon's premise that constitutional
safeguards must be upheld regardless of the verdict's reliability would re-
store the integrity to the criminal justice system that is lost when a law-
yer abdicates his responsibility to his client.18'
In addition to changes in the substantive law that are needed to as-
sure effective prepresentation, structural improvements to the judicial
system are necessary. The court system has integrated lawyers outside of
the criminal field and recent law school graduates into the criminal sys-
tem to reduce the case load on regular criminal attorneys. 82 The com-
plexities of criminal representation, however, minimize the practical sig-
nificance of an inexperienced lawyer's contribution to criminal defense.
An excellent device for improving the quality of representation is placing
limits on the number of cases an attorney can accept in a year. 83 If
caseload limits are imposed, a defense lawyer's compensation per case
must rise to retain private attorneys. Since the compensation per case is
presently inadequate, criminal lawyers carry a large caseload to obtain
reasonable yearly compensation."" In addition, more lawyers will be
needed to account for the reduction in each lawyer's caseload. Therefore,
the budget of the court system must be increased to accommodate the
need for higher pay and more lawyers to make reduced caseload limits a
viable alternative.
1 8 5
The threat of a legal malpractice claim regulates the quality of legal
representation outside of the criminal justice field.186 However, only eight
criminal malpractice claims have ever been brought before the courts and
all of them have been decided in favor of the attorney. 87 In addition, a
181 Accord, Remedying Assistance, supra note 143, at 770-72. But cf. Bines, supra note
3, at 959-70.
182 See Bazelon, supra note 3, at 11-14; Brody, supra note 4, at 21-22.
183 See Joint Comm. of the Judicial Conf. of the D.C. Cir. and the D.C. Bar (Unified),
Report on Criminal Defense Services in the District of Columbia (Austern-Rezneck Report)
(April 1975) 99-100, 122-23; Working Papers from the Nat'l Conf. on Crim. Jus.: The
Courts § 13.12 (Jan. 26, 1973).
I" See id.; note 183 supra.
188 See Bazelon, supra note 3, at 8-9; Finer, supra note 3, at 1120. Bazelon points out
the disparity between criminal lawyers' fees and corporate attorney's compensation.
Bazelon, supra note 3, at 8. See also Decoster III, slip op. at 2 n.3 (Bazelon dissenting).
'8 See Kaus & Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Relections on "Criminal
Malpractice," 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1191, 1196 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Kaus]; Kaus and
Mallen assert that regardless of the standard adopted to govern ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, a lawyer's performance that is poor enough to upset a criminal conviction
would raise a showing of negligence sufficient to provide a jury question on an action for
criminal malpractice. Id.
1587 See Annot. 53 A.L.R.3d 731 (1973). See also Bazelon, supra note 3, at 17; Bines,
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malpractice action is expensive and most criminal defendants are indi-
gent and unaware that such an action exists.""8 Therefore, legal malprac-
tice suits have been an unacceptable method of assuring effective repre-
sentation. Other recent alternatives to correcting the institutional
shortcomings have been offered. Suggestions include requiring criminal
lawyers to be certified, requiring defense counsel to complete a checklist
of investigative duties before going to trial, which the judge can monitor,
and requiring the trial judge to supervise lawyers more closely during
trial to remedy questionable defense counsel representation.189
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supra note 3, at 972-77. Bazelon described criminal malpractice litigation as insignificant.
Bazelon, supra note 3, at 17. Bines stated that the remedies such as criminal malpractice
actions, while theoretically available, are virtually nonexistent. Bines, supra note 3, at 972.
18 See Bines, supra note 3, at 973. See also Decoster III, slip op. at 1-6, 70-75 (Bazelon
dissenting). Bazelon argues that the indigent, those least likely to be aware of and assert
their rights, suffer most from ineffective assistance. Id.
189 See Taque, supra note 11, at 161-65; Bazelon, supra note 3, at 18-21; Bines, supra
note 3, at 976-983; Finer, supra note 3, at 1116-1120. Bazelon suggests that lawyers should
have to be certified for the criminal law as a specialty. Bazelon, supra note 3, at 18-19. To
become certified, Finer suggests that criminal lawyers be required to take an examination
and obtain a certain amount of experience before being permitted to represent a defendant
alone. Bines, supra note 3, at 1116-19. Taque advocates the check list of preparation respon-
sibilities because it is easily administered and requires a minimum intrusion on the attor-
ney-client privilege. Taque, supra note 11, at 161-67.
Judge Bazelon advocated that the trial judge employ a more formalized procedure to
inquire into the adequacy of counsel's preparation than asking the simple question, "Is de-
fense ready?". Decoster III, slip op. at 72-73 (Bazelon dissenting). The checklist approach
proposed by Bazelon would include vital aspects of counsel's preparation such as, what
records were obtained, which witnesses were interviewed, when defendant was consulted,
and what motions were filed. Id. During trial, the judge could take a more active role in
preventing ineffectiveness claims according to Bazelon. Id. slip op. at 74 n.162 (Bazelon dis-
senting). Where defense counsel has apparently overlooked a valid defense or made a major
tactical error the trial judge could ask whether counsel's action is based on an informed
tactical reason. Id. If counsel is unable to provide an affirmative response to the trial judge's
initial inquiry, the defendant would welcome a further inquiry to safeguard his rights. Id.
Since the attorney-client privilege is designed to protect the client, not the attorney, the
trial judge's inquiry would be consistent with the defendant's interests. Id.; see Lakeside v.
Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1978) (judge is ultimately responsible for conduct of fair
trial); United States v. Powe, 591 F.2d 833, 846-47 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (trial judge must prevent
forfeit of criminal defendant's constitutional rights through ineffective performance of ill-
prepared counsel).
The primary obstacle to a court's increased use of supervisory powers is that the court
would have to oversee major decisions and activities of defense counsel, changing the essen-
tial nature of the adversary process. See Decoster III, slip op. at 25-30 (MacKinnon concur-
ring in result); Decoster III, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 22-23 (plurality); Commonwealth v.
Irby, 230 Pa. Super. Ct. 317, 321-22, 326 A.2d 617; 619-20 (1974). In Irby, the court recog-
nized that counsel must be afforded discretion in his employment of trial strategy.
[Vol. XXXVII
